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Abstract
Over the past decade, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) has shifted from its original focus on
regional peace and stability toward embracing a progressively
economics-dominated agenda. A multitude of initiatives
concerning cooperation in the areas of trade and finance have
been launched. At the 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali, ASEAN
leaders even declared the goal of establishing an ASEAN
Economic Community by 2020. This paper discusses two
factors that have contributed to ASEAN's increasing focus on
economic cooperation: (1) the Asian financial crisis, and (2)
the emergence of China as a major international and economic
power. It is argued that these determinants have paved the way
for closer economic cooperation within the region despite the
great heterogeneity and conflicting interests of the ASEAN
member countries.
  
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations1 (ASEAN) has redefined itself as a grouping that is
increasingly occupied with economic issues. It has shifted
from its original focus on regional peace and stability toward
embracing a progressively economics-dominated agenda. A
multitude of initiatives concerning cooperation in the areas of
trade and finance have been launched. At the 2003 ASEAN
Summit in Bali, ASEAN leaders even declared the goal of
establishing an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by
2020. The AEC is envisaged as a single market and production
base with free flow of goods, services, investments, capital and
skilled labor.2
These developments toward economic regionalism and
the change of ASEAN’s mission partly reflect the end of the
cold war and the concomitant ideological conflicts between
capitalism and communism. This paper discusses two other
factors that have contributed to ASEAN’s new focus on
economic cooperation: (1) the Asian financial crisis, and (2)
the emergence of China as a major international and economic
power. It is argued that these determinants have created
sufficient common ground amongst ASEAN member
countries to initiate regional economic cooperation despite the
great heterogeneity and conflicting interests of the ASEAN
nations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: after
a brief look at the heterogeneity amongst ASEAN countries in
the next section, section three discusses how the Asian
financial crisis and its perceived mismanagement by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the U.S. government
on the one hand, and the emergence of the Chinese economy
on the other hand, have pushed ASEAN toward pursuing an
economic integration agenda. Section four outlines a set of
characteristics that illustrate ASEAN’s evolving economic
regionalism. Section five concludes.
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2. Heterogeneity within ASEAN
East Asian and Southeast Asian countries have long been
noted for their lack of interest in regional (economic)
cooperation. While embracing an export-led strategy of
development, they were more oriented toward the world
markets than their regional neighbors. This can be attributed
to the regions’ heterogeneity: the ASEAN member countries
represent a smorgasbord in terms of size of population,
economy and political system.
Figure one shows the great disparity of income between
Southeast Asian countries. GDP per capita ranges from as little
as USD 328 in Cambodia and USD 372 in Lao, over USD 4,221
in Malaysia to USD 23,636 in Singapore. In terms of
population, ASEAN countries also differ widely,
encompassing countries as small as Brunei (361,417 people),
Singapore (4,335,000) and Lao (5,792, 450), and as large as
Vietnam and the Philippines (about 82 and 83 million,
respectively), and even Indonesia (217.6 m) (see figure two).
Figure 1: GDP per capita of ASEAN countries in 2004
(in constant 2000 USD prices)
Source: WDI, note: data for Brunei and Myanmar are n.a.
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Figure 2: Population of ASEAN countries in 2004
Source: WDI
Heterogeneity in terms of population and income does not
automatically imply an obstacle to integration, as shown by
the European Union (EU). The EU also encompasses
countries as tiny as Malta (401,000 people) and Luxembourg
(450,000 people) and as large as Germany with a population
of 82,630,660. In terms of per capita income, EU countries are
also uneven. For instance, per capita income in Greece, the
poorest of the “old” EU member states, is only about a quarter
of Luxembourg’s, the richest country. This income disparity
widened even further with the EU enlargement in 2003 –
people in the Slovak Republic, the poorest EU member
country, enjoy on average only nine per cent of Luxemburg’s
per capita income (all data are for 2004, source: WDI).
Yet a crucial distinction between the EU and ASEAN is
ASEAN’s disparity with respect to their political and economic
systems. While all EU member countries have established
democratic societies and free market economies, ASEAN
member countries encompass the full scale of political and
economic systems, ranging from free democracies to
authoritarian regimes, and free market economies to centrally
planned command economies. Table one shows the 2005
Freedom House assessment of the state of freedom for ASEAN
countries. For this index, countries are evaluated based on a
checklist of questions on political rights and civil liberties that
3
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are derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Each country is assigned a rating for political rights and a
rating for civil liberties based on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1
represents the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest.
The combined average of each country’s political rights and
civil liberties ratings determines an overall status of “free”,
“partly free,” or “not free.” While, according to this
classification, the people of the Philippines and Thailand live
in “free societies” that grant them comprehensive political
rights and civil liberties, the societies of Indonesia, Malaysia
and Singapore are only classified as “partly free.” Brunei,
Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar and Vietnam are classified as “not
free.”
Table 1: Freedom rating for ASEAN countries 2005
Source: Freedom House (2005)
Economic freedom also varies greatly between ASEAN
countries, as shown in table two. From a list of 155 countries
included in The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal
Index of Economic Freedom, Singapore ranked second3, which is
in sharp contrasts with countries such as the Philippines,
Indonesia and Vietnam, whose economies are classified as
“mostly unfree,” or Lao and Burma, whose economies are
classified as “repressed.”
Such disparities in terms of population size, economic
development, as well as political and economic systems can
provide an explanation as to why ASEAN countries have long
struggled to engage in cooperation that goes beyond a broad
political and security dialogue.
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Table 2: 2005 Index of Economic Freedom
Source: The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal (2005)
Note: The definition of scores is: 1-1.99: free, 2-2.99: mostly
free, 3-3.99: mostly unfree, 4-5: repressed
While the disparities just described have not lessened over
the past years, the drive toward regional cooperation, and
particularly economic cooperation, has indeed become more
serious. It is thus worthwhile to ask why – despite their
heterogeneity – Southeast Asian countries seem to have
overcome their qualms with respect to regional (economic)
integration.
3. Push factors for ASEAN economic integration
There are certainly multiple factors that have directed
ASEAN toward pursuing an increasingly economics-based
agenda. One such factor is the end of the cold war and the
concomitant ideological conflicts between capitalism and
communism.
Another factor is a general trend toward economic
regionalism that has become most visible through trade blocs
such as the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur).
Indeed, the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in
1992, for long one of the most notable – albeit somewhat half-
hearted – efforts of economic integration within ASEAN, can
be partly explained by concerns that the emergence of other
trade blocs would put ASEAN countries in a disadvantage.
In what follows, two other factors are scrutinized that are
argued to have paved the way for closer economic cooperation
within the region despite the great heterogeneity and
5
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conflicting interests of the ASEAN member countries: the
Asian financial crisis and the rise of China.
The Asian financial crisis
The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 sparked great
political interest in economic and particularly monetary and
financial cooperation and integration in the region. The crisis
revealed the fragility of the region’s prevailing monetary and
exchange rate arrangements and led to the understanding  that
a strengthening of the regional financial architecture is
urgently needed. Cooperation on a regional level is now
regarded as a potentially promising way forward. Arguably,
the Asian financial crisis has been “the key catalytic event to
propel regional cooperation” (Padoa-Schioppa 2005, p. 30).
The move toward regionalism is indeed not limited to
Southeast Asian countries. The Northeast Asian countries too,
i.e. China, Japan and Korea, have shown ample interest in
fostering economic cooperation within the region.4 Bergsten
(2000) even suggested that East Asia may be on the brink of a
historical evolution, as Europe was half a century ago.
The Asian crisis has played such a pivotal role in pushing
regional integration tendencies for two reasons. Firstly, it has
made East Asian countries realize that they are closely tied
together economically. After Thailand was hit, the crisis spilled
over to the other countries in the region, even affecting those
countries that were regarded as pursuing relatively sound and
sustainable economic policies. Contagion, i.e. the cross-
country transmission of shocks, makes it increasingly difficult
if not impossible for open economies to isolate themselves
from shocks to their trading partners. Research by Glick and
Rose (1999) has shown that currency crises tend to spread
along regional lines, and that trade linkages are an important
transmission channel for crises. Glick and Rose’s findings
suggest that countries may be attacked because of the actions
– or inaction – of their neighbors, who tend to be trading
partners merely because of geographical proximity. They
conclude that “[c]ountries who trade and compete with the
targets of speculative attacks are themselves likely to be
attacked.” (Glick and Rose 1999, p. 604) For East Asia – a
region in which intra-regional trade accounts for almost fifty
6
   
per cent of overall trade – the danger of financial contagion
provides a strong argument for strengthening regional
cooperation and surveillance in the spheres of money and
finance. Furthermore, because of the strong intra-regional
trade linkages and East Asian countries’ competition against
one another in third markets – North America and Europe in
particular – exchange rate spillover effects from one country to
another are of great importance. Hence, mutual exchange rate
stability is the “quintessential public good” (McKinnon 2005).
This provides an explanation for the region’s interest in
developing a formal regional exchange rate mechanism, or
even a common currency.
The second important effect of the financial crisis is that it
has evoked a strong feeling of discontent with the handling of
the crisis by the international community and the IMF and
U.S government in particular. The IMF has been accused of
responding too late and giving flawed advice to the crisis
economies.5 Lincoln (2004, p. 254) asserts that the crisis had
caused a “common sense of irritation, frustration, and
disagreement with the U.S. government and the IMF”
throughout the region, and partly even anti-Western and
particularly anti-American attitudes.
The dissatisfaction with the IMF is also due to the region’s
under-representation in the Fund. While ASEAN constitutes
8.6 percent of the world’s population (6,345,127,000), they
hold a meagre 3.5 percent of IMF voting rights (cf. table
three). This contrasts sharply with the influence of the big
shareholder countries (US with 17.08 percent, Japan with 6.24
percent, Germany with 6.09 percent and France and the UK
with 5.03 percent each). The IMF is considered to be overly
dominated by U.S. interests and unresponsive to Asian
concerns, creating a strong incentive for East Asian countries
to increase their formal multilateral economic cooperation in
order to limit dependence on IMF support (Fukuyama 2005a,
p. 79).
Already during the Asian crisis, attempts were made to
establish a regional scheme for financial cooperation. In
August 1997, only weeks after the outbreak of the crisis in
Thailand on July 2, the Japanese government proposed the
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creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) as a framework
for financial cooperation and policy coordination in the region.
The AMF, it was argued, would provide a means of defense
against financial crises in Asia. Kwan (2001, p. 35) sees the
endeavor to build an AMF “as an attempt by Asian countries to
escape domination by Washington and to achieve financial
independence.” It is therefore not surprising that the AMF was
averted by the objection of the U.S. government and the IMF.
Table 3: IMF quota and voting rights of ASEAN countries
Source: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm#1
The idea of an AMF – though under a different name –
was revived when the ASEAN finance ministers met with their
Chinese, Japanese and Korean counterparts (known as the
ASEAN + 3 grouping) on May 6, 2000 in Chiang Mai,
Thailand, where they agreed to establish a system of bilateral
short-term financing facilities within the group. This
agreement, called the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), provides
for mutual assistance consisting of swap arrangements in the
event of a financial crisis.6
The feeling of being let down by the international
community and the demand for a regional response was
exemplarily expressed by Il Sakong, president of the Institute
for Global Economics in Seoul, during the meeting in Chiang
Mai where he stated that “[w]e need to have some kind of
defense mechanism. Since not much is expected to be done at
the global level, something should be done at the regional
level“ (cf. Dieter 2000, p. 22). The wording of the declaration
of the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers (2000) at Chiang Mai
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diplomatically depicts the region’s desire for reducing
dependence on the IMF:
“In order to strengthen our self-help and support mechanisms
in East Asia through the ASEAN + 3 framework, we recognized
a need to establish a regional financing arrangement to
supplement the existing international facilities. As a start, we
agreed to strengthen the existing cooperative frameworks
among our monetary authorities through the ‘Chiang Mai
Initiative.’”
The CMI consist of an expanded ASEAN Swap
Arrangement (ASA) that includes the ASEAN countries and a
network of Bilateral Swap Arrangements (BSAs) among
ASEAN + 3 countries. The ASA is now USD 1 billion in size,
while sixteen BSAs have been successfully concluded with a
combined total size of USD 36.5 billion.
Another important regional initiative in the field of money
and finance is the ASEAN Surveillance Process, which the
ASEAN Finance Ministers agreed on in Washington in
October 1998. The terms of understanding for the
establishment of the ASEAN Surveillance Process describe its
objective as strengthening cooperation by (1) exchanging
information and discussing the economic and financial
development of member states in the region, (2) providing an
early warning system and a peer review process to enhance
macroeconomic stability and the financial system in the
region, (3) highlighting possible policy options and
encouraging early unilateral or collective actions to prevent a
crisis, and (4) monitoring and discussing global economic and
financial developments which could have implications on the
region and proposing possible actions on a regional and
national level (ASEAN 1998).
A third field of cooperation directly resulting from the
crisis is the development of regional security markets. For
instance, ASEAN + 3 countries have developed the Asian Bond
Market Initiative (ABMI). The ABMI was originally proposed
by Japan in 2002. The aim of the ABMI is to develop efficient
and liquid bond markets in Asia in order to enable a better
utilization of Asian savings for Asian investments and to avoid
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the currency and maturity mismatches in financing that
exacerbated the financial crisis. The ABMI includes efforts to
modify existing regulations to facilitate the issuance of and
investment in local currency denominated bonds, as well as
the development of new securitized debt instrumens, credit
guarantees and investment mechanisms, foreign exchange
transactions and settlement issues and rating systems.
Compelmentary activities are the launch of the Asian Bond
Fund I and II by the Executives’ Meeting of East-Asia and
Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP).7
As Padoa-Schioppa (2005, p. 31) notes, “these initiatives
are more than just a first step towards greater cooperation,
they have also created important fora for an ongoing policy
dialogue at the level of finance ministers and central bank
governors.” And indeed, they would have been unthinkable
without the changes in the ASEAN policymaker’s attitudes
toward regional cooperation brought about by the Asian crisis.
The rise of China
The second factor that has promoted ASEAN economic
cooperation is the rise of China. The past years have seen what
Napoléon Bonaparte allegedly predicted two hundred years
ago: “Quand la Chine s’éveillera, le monde tremblera.” Like
much of the rest of the world, ASEAN countries have watched
China’s transformation and international opening since the
1970s. As Zheng (2005, p. 18) describes it:
“Since starting to open up and reform its economy in 1978,
China has averaged 9.4 percent annual GDP growth, one of
the highest growth rates in the world. In 1978, it accounted for
less than one percent of the world economy, and its total
foreign trade was worth $20.6 billion. Today, it accounts for
four percent of the world economy and has foreign trade worth
$851 billion – the third-largest national total in the world.
China has also attracted hundreds of billions of dollars of
foreign investment and more than a trillion dollars of domestic
nonpublic investment. A dozen years ago, China barely had
mobile telecommunications services. Now it claims more than
300 million mobile-phone subscribers, more than any other
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nation. As of June 2004, nearly 100 million people there had
access to the Internet.”
China’s progress has unsettled many of its neighbors and
trading partners. The rise of China is different from that of
any other country because of its sheer size. Even for a grouping
as large as ASEAN with a population of almost 550 million,
China poses a great challenge (cf. figure three). According to
predictions, China’s population will reach 1.5 billion in 2030
(Zheng 2005, p. 18).
China’s economy is already much larger than that of all
ASEAN countries combined (cf. figure four). China is now the
second largest economy in the world after the U.S. when
measured in purchasing power parity, and the fourth largest in
nominal terms.
In an increasingly competitive and globalized
environment, there are deep concerns in Southeast Asia that it
will be overtaken by China. Fears exist that China’s seemingly
unlimited supply of cheap labor (cf. figure five) will erode
ASEAN countries’ competitiveness. While China is also seen
as a potential export market, with one billion “new capitalists”
and consumers (cf. Prestowitz 2005), ASEAN countries worry
about losing their competitive edge, especially in high-
technology markets (Hale and Hale 2003).8
China has also become the largest recipient of foreign
direct investment (FDI) flows in the Asia-Pacific region (cf.
figure six). There is a growing perception that China’s rapidly
expanding economy diverts FDI inflows away from ASEAN
toward China. While empirical evidence gives no indication of
crowding out, and suggests that FDI flows to China did not
have much impact on FDI to other countries in Asia
(Mercereau 2005), the fears persist.
Whether the fears are well founded or not – they seem to
have nurtured the notion that ASEAN countries need to
restructure and integrate their economies in order to stay
competitive and remain an important growth pole in the
global economy.
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Figure 3: Population: ASEAN vs. China (2004)
Source: WDI
Figure 4: GDP (current USD): ASEAN vs. China (2004)
Source: WDI, Note: data for Brunei and Myanmar is n.a.
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Figure 5: Total labor force: ASEAN vs. China (2004)
Source: WDI
Figure 6: Foreign direct investment (net inflows, current USD):
ASEAN vs. China (2003)
Source: WDI
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The rationale is that an integrated ASEAN market with a
combined population of more than 500 million should keep
the region competitive vis-à-vis China – and the other rising
giant, namely India. The proposed AEC mentioned earlier
could provide the means for ASEAN to revitalize and remain
competitive in the face of the challenges posed by the rise of
China as well as globalization. The establishment of an AEC
could strengthen the position of ASEAN member states with
regard to its neighbors as well as international institutions like
the IMF or the World Trade Organization, and give them a
bigger voice on the world stage (Hew 2003).
4. Characteristics of ASEAN economic regionalism
Having discussed the reasons for ASEAN’s increasing
interest in fostering economic integration, some characteristics
of Southeast Asian economic regionalism will be outlined
below.
Contextualism
ASEAN economic regionalism has to be seen in the
context of the regional as well as global setting (Henning
2005). As described above, the drive toward regional
integration is born less out of love, but rather conditioned on
a realization of its benefits in containing external factors.
These external factors – the international community’s
response to the Asian crisis and the rise of China – as well as
the relatively successful example of the EU have transmitted
the idea of strengthening each country’s position by means of
forming a closer economic alliance.
Non-exclusive process
So far, the process of integration has been relatively open
and non-exclusive. That is, while Southeast Asian countries
have fostered economic integration within the ASEAN
framework, it has not been the only platform for regional
cooperation. Cooperation has also developed with China,
Japan and Korea within the ASEAN + 3 framework or through
other regional fora such as EMEAP. Another platform for
cooperation has been the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
14
       
Forum (APEC), a grouping that not only includes East Asian
countries and the United States but also Australia, Canada,
Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru and
Russia. While APEC, which was established in 1989 partly as
a strategy by the U.S. to prevent the emergence of an East
Asian regionalism that would deliberately exclude the U.S.9,
has lost in importance and appeal to East Asian countries,
there are few signs that ASEAN or ASEAN + 3 are aiming for
a closed economic bloc that would exclude and discriminate
non-participating countries, a concern raised by Lincoln
(2004). Indeed, despite the anti-Western rhetoric that is
sometimes heard in East Asia, the economic self-interest of
East Asian nations in maintaining and improving trade and
investment linkages with the United States and Europe is far
too large to let them form a closed economic bloc that is hostile
to the West. Indeed, ASEAN countries have been very open
toward the West, as shown by the recent and highly successful
attempts of East Asian countries to attract foreign, and
particularly American and European, direct investment.
Evolutionary process without clear strategy
Despite the stated goal of forming an AEC, ASEAN
economic regionalism remains a very patchy framework
without clear leadership and weak institutionalization. It has
not yet become clear what form of integration is to be achieved
(Volz 2005). There is a lack of clarity and consensus about the
direction in which (South) East Asian economic integration is
heading. The countries involved seem to have different
interpretations of integration and even more diverse
ambitions.
For instance, it is not clear what degree of sovereignty
national governments are willing to give up in the process of
integration. The Bali Concord II emphasizes the importance of
the principle of non-interference which apparently contradicts
the declared goal of forming a real community, as it more or
less rules out the transfer of parts of national sovereignty to
the community (cf. Hatakeyama 2005). But if ASEAN member
countries refuse to concede sovereignty to ASEAN or the AEC,
the whole point of creating such a community is redundant.
15
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5. Conclusion
The Asian financial crisis and the rise of China have
created a situation in which ASEAN countries find closer
regional economic cooperation a compelling necessity in order
to shield off further crises and remain competitive in an
increasingly globalized world. But despite declarations of
forming an AEC and various other initiatives, the realization of
such plans has been slow. ASEAN member countries do not
appear to have agreed on a clear vision for ASEAN economic
cooperation. Instead, they seem to be driven by differing
strategic interests. But as Hatakeyama (2005) points out:
“…unless both ASEAN countries and non-ASEAN economies
can agree on a definition of community, there is a possibility,
as the old saying in China goes, that they might have different
dreams despite being in the same bed.”
16
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Notes
1The ten members of ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and
Vietnam.
2The ASEAN “Vision 2020” of 1997 already declared the goal of
creating “a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN
Economic Region in which there is a free flow of goods,
services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable
economic development and reduced poverty and socio-
economic disparities.” (ASEAN 1997) On the AEC see Hew and
Soesastro (2003) and Plummer and Click (2005).
3Hong Kong ranks number one, and the U.S. ranks twelve.
4The term “East Asia” is here used for the whole region, i.e.
both Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.
5For criticism on the IMF’s handling of the Asian crisis see, for
example, Feldstein (1998).
6On the CMI see Park and Wang (2003).
7On the Asian Bond Fund see Ma and Remolona (2005).
8ASEAN has indeed attempted to explore trade and investment
opportunities with China. For instance, ASEAN and China
have agreed to create the world’s largest free trade area by 2012,
with more than 1.7 billion people. A similar trading
arrangement between ASEAN and Japan has been established,
and a trading arrangement between ASEAN and Korea is
underway. These arrangements are envisaged as building
blocks for a possible establishment of an East Asia Free Trade
Area (EAFTA) involving ASEAN +3.
9Such tendencies did exist. For instance, in 1990, the former
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir proposed the creation of
an East Asian Economic Caucus, a multilateral grouping of
East Asian countries that would exclude countries like the U.S.
and Australia. The U.S. and Australia were vehemently
opposed to this. At American behest, the Japanese quietly
sought to kill the idea, while the Australians worked hard to
promote a more inclusive APEC forum as an alternative (cf.
Fukuyama 2005b).
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